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CELL-SITE LOCATION INFORMATION AND THE
PRIVACIES OF LIFE: THE IMPACT OF
CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
Trevor Moore*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cell phones have become an “important feature of human
anatomy,”1 and Americans should not forfeit their Fourth Amendment
rights simply for owning one. The Framers’ central aim in drafting the
Fourth Amendment, as the Supreme Court has made clear, was to
secure “‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power,’”2 which
includes placing “obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance.”3 However, as technology has advanced, Fourth
Amendment protections have become weaker and weaker.
For example, law enforcement may now use cell phones and cellsite location information (CSLI) to discover an individual’s location.4
Prior to June 22, 2018, law enforcement could contact a cell phone
service provider, such as Verizon, T-Mobile, or Sprint, and obtain
CSLI by demonstrating to a judge that the “records sought ‘[were]
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.’”5 This
standard is extremely easy to meet and “falls well short of the probable
cause required for a warrant.”6
This type of surveillance is “too permeating,”7 and without
change, Americans will be left “at the mercy of advancing
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Criminal Justice,
California State University, Chico, May 2012. Thank you to the editors and staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work in editing this Note. In addition, thank you to my
family for the constant love and support.
1. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
2. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (emphasis added) (quoting Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
3. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
4. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at
16, Rios v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2701 (2018) (No. 16-7314).
5. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)).
6. Id. at 2221.
7. Id. at 2214 (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595).
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technology.”8 Fortunately, in Carpenter v. United States,9 the
Supreme Court made the requirements to obtain CSLI more
stringent.10 However, while this modification was a big step in the
right direction, it was not enough.
This Note explains the impact Carpenter had on determining
whether individuals maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
records of their physical movements captured through real-time CSLI.
Further, this Note proposes that real-time CSLI, just like historical
CSLI, should be protected by the Fourth Amendment and that a
warrant should be required before law enforcement may obtain it.
Part II of this Note describes how cell phones operate, what CSLI
is, and how CSLI is collected. Part III analyzes the development of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence through Carpenter. Part IV
explains the current state of the law and demonstrates, through three
case illustrations, that lower courts are split on how to interpret the
Carpenter decision. Part V sets out the proper way of interpreting
Carpenter and how states can expedite the process of properly
protecting their citizens. Lastly, Part VI concludes that the majority of
lower courts are moving in the correct direction and that there is hope
in the near future that all citizens will be properly protected against
warrantless searches of their real-time CSLI.
II. CELL PHONES AND CELL-SITE LOCATION INFORMATION
A. The Ubiquitous Use of Cell Phones
There are 421.7 million wireless devices in the United States—
nearly 1.3 devices for every person in the country.11 In 2008, 77
percent of Americans owned a cell phone.12 In 2019, it has risen to a
staggering 96 percent, with 81 percent owning smartphones.13 In
addition, Americans are using their cell phones at unprecedented rates.
Data usage is up over 73 times what it was in 2010 and continues to
increase.14 For example, from 2017 to 2018, there was an 82 percent
8. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001)).
9. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
10. See id. at 2223.
11. 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA (June 20, 2019), https://www.ctia.org/news/2019annual-survey-highlights.
12. Mobile
Fact
Sheet,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(June 12,
2019),
https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile.
13. Id.
14. 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, supra note 11.
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increase in mobile data use, which is “more data than was used in the
first six and a half years of this decade—combined.”15
Cell phones are a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life.”16 Not
only does almost everyone own a cell phone, but people use them all
day long, carry them everywhere they go, and rarely, if ever, turn them
off. For example, 94 percent of smartphone owners “frequently” carry
their phones,17 79 percent have their phones on or nearby for 22 hours
a day,18 and 82 percent never turn their phones off.19
B. How Cell Phones and CSLI Function
When cell phones are turned on, they continuously scan the
environment in search of the best signal, which comes from the closest
cell site.20 Each time a cell phone “connects to a cell site, it generates
a time-stamped record known as [CSLI].”21 This information contains
the time when the user connected to the site as well as the location of
the site itself.22 The record reveals “where the phone—and by proxy,
its owner—is or has been,” through “triangulating its precise location
based on which cell sites receive” transmissions.23
Modern phones, such as smartphones, connect with cell sites
“several times a minute,”24 “but can connect as frequently as every
seven seconds.”25 When smartphones connect to cell sites, they
“generate location data even in the absence of any user interaction with
the phone.”26 This occurs because smartphones have applications
which continuously “run in the background,” such as email
applications.27 Even turning off the location-privacy settings on the
phone will not affect the service provider’s ability to access CSLI.28
15. Id.
16. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
17. LEE RAINIE & KATHRYN ZICKUHR, PEW RES. CTR., AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON MOBILE
ETIQUETTE 2 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/08/26/chapter-1-alwayson-connectivity.
18. Allison Stadd, 79% of People 18-44 Have Their Smartphones with Them 22 Hours a Day,
ADWEEK (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:00 PM), https://www.adweek.com/digital/smartphones.
19. RAINIE & ZICKUHR, supra note 17.
20. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
21. Id.
22. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 4, at 16.
23. Id. at 12, 16.
24. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
25. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 4, at 16.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 9.
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Thus, the only way phone users can protect their location data is to
completely shut off their phones.29
The accuracy of the location information “depends on the size of
the geographic area covered by the cell site.”30 The greater the
concentration of cell sites, the more accurate the location data will
be.31 To handle the massive increase in cell phone usage, service
providers are building more and more cell sites, which in turn creates
more accurate CSLI.32
Generally, cell sites are mounted on towers.33 However, more
recently, they have been placed on “light posts, flagpoles, church
steeples, [and] the sides of buildings.”34 As of 2018, there are 349,344
cell sites in the United States,35 totaling more than a 52 percent growth
over the last decade.36 This substantial growth is not coming to an end.
Analysts project that another 800,000 cell sites will be built in the next
few years.37 Even with the current 349,344 cell sites, CSLI is
approaching GPS-level precision.38 This means that CSLI can
pinpoint a phone’s location within a “few feet of its position,” and will
only become more accurate as more cell sites are created.39
Service providers collect and retain CSLI for several reasons and
for various periods of time. For example, in its privacy statement, TMobile explains that:
[i]f your mobile device is turned on, our network is collecting
data about the device location. We may use, provide access
to, or disclose this network location data without your
approval to provide and support our services, including to
route wireless communications, operate and improve our
29. RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF
LAW, CELLPHONES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: HOW THE GOVERNMENT
IS COLLECTING AND USING YOUR LOCATION DATA 2 (2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Cell_Surveillance_Privacy.pdf
(“[S]hort of turning off one’s phone, it is nearly impossible to prevent the transmission of location
data.”).
30. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
31. Id. at 2211–12.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2211.
34. Id.
35. 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, supra note 11.
36. 2018 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA (July 10, 2018), https://www.ctia.org/news/thestate-of-wireless-2018.
37. Id.
38. See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2.
39. Id. at 1.
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network and business, detect and prevent fraud, provide
emergency responders information about how to find you
when you call 911, or as required by law or emergency.40
Service providers will retain this data anywhere from three months to
seven years.41
C. How Law Enforcement Uses CSLI
Law enforcement may obtain CSLI from service providers if it
satisfies certain requirements. As mentioned above, prior to
Carpenter, law enforcement could obtain CSLI with a court order
under the Stored Communications Act.42 The Stored Communications
Act “permits the Government to compel the disclosure of certain
telecommunications records when it ‘offers specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the
records sought ‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.’”43 This “showing falls well short of the probable cause
required for a warrant” and needed a change.44 The Supreme Court, in
Carpenter, attempted to make that change. However, it was not
enough. The reason why the change was insufficient will be explained
in Parts IV and V of this Note.
There are two types of CSLI which law enforcement may collect:
“historical” CSLI and “real-time” CSLI.45 Historical CSLI is location
information collected by a service provider “in the past,” or, in other
words, “prior to the time of a data request.”46 This includes data that
was collected “one day ago, one month ago, one year ago or
beyond.”47 Law enforcement uses historical CSLI “to look back
through service provider records to determine a suspect’s location at a
given point in the past.”48 This allows law enforcement to “prove that
40. Privacy Policy, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/responsibility/privacy/privacypolicy (last updated Dec. 21, 2019).
41. Cellular Provider Record Retention Periods, PROF. DIGITAL FORENSIC CONSULTING:
BLOG (Apr. 5, 2017), https://prodigital4n6.com/cellular-provider-record-retention-periods (listing
data retention periods for five different service providers).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
43. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
44. Id. at 2221.
45. State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 328 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
46. Cell Site Location Information: What Is It?, ELECTRIC FRONTIER FOUND.: CRIM.
DEFENDER TOOLKIT, https://www.eff.org/criminaldefender/cell-site-location (last visited Nov. 15,
2019).
47. Id.
48. Andrews, 134 A.3d at 328 n.3.
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a defendant was in the area where a crime of which he is accused
occurred.”49
Real-time CSLI is “current or future location information . . . that
live-tracks a cell phone’s location at any given moment.”50 Law
enforcement uses real-time CSLI “to track the whereabouts and
movements of a suspect by using the cell phone as a tracking
device.”51 It is commonly used to assist law enforcement in locating a
suspect to make an arrest.52
There are two main methods by which law enforcement collect
historical CSLI. First, and most commonly, law enforcement will
request past location information from a service provider for
particular cell phone numbers.53 The other method, called “cell tower
dumps,” is where law enforcement agencies “request information
about every device connected to a single tower during a particular
interval, potentially netting historical location information from
thousands of phones.”54
There are also two main methods in which law enforcement
collects real-time CSLI. The first method, called “pinging,” is where
law enforcement requests that service providers “‘ping’ phones to
force them into revealing their location.”55 Pinging “relies on
Enhanced 911 (E911) data, which allows law enforcement to pinpoint
the location of cell phones that have placed 911 calls.”56 However, the
“provider can also make a reverse 911 call, allowing the police to
invisibly track a target’s cell phone in real time.”57 The second
method, the use of “cell-site simulators” or “Stingrays,” effectively
allows law enforcement to “circumvent the service provider and gain
direct access to real-time” CSLI.58 The device “‘masquerades as a cell
tower, tricking all nearby cell phones to connect to itself’ rather than

49. Id.
50. Cell Site Location Information: What Is It?, supra note 46.
51. Andrews, 134 A.3d at 328 n.3.
52. Primer from Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Cell Phone Location Tracking (June
7, 2016), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-TrackingPrimer_Final.pdf.
53. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id.; Cellular Provider Record Retention Periods, supra note 41.
56. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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to a legitimate tower.”59 When used, “whether by hand, from within a
patrol car, or attached to a plane,” the device gathers the real-time
CSLI “of all phones within range.”60
Law enforcement agencies frequently collect CSLI. For example,
in 2018, T-Mobile received 104,221 requests for CSLI.61 In particular,
it received 70,224 historical requests, 6,184 tower dump requests, and
27,813 real-time requests.62 Additionally, in just the first half of
2019,63 AT&T received 47,110 requests for CSLI.64 In particular, it
received 37,144 historical requests, 1,497 tower dump requests, and
8,469 real-time requests.65
III. EXISTING FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW IMPACTING CSLI
The distinction between historical CSLI and real-time CSLI has
significant legal ramifications when it comes to Fourth Amendment
protection. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”66 However, courts have
struggled with determining whether CSLI is protected by the Fourth
Amendment because CSLI does “not fit neatly under existing [Fourth
Amendment] precedents.”67
In legal terms, CSLI is defined as “personal location information
maintained by a third party.”68 The “personal location information,”
refers to the time-stamped record generated each time the cell phone
connects to a cell site, and the “third party” refers to a cell-phone
provider, such as Verizon, T-Mobile, or Sprint.69

59. Id. (quoting George Joseph, Cellphone Spy Tools Have Flooded Local Police
Departments, CITYLAB (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/02/cellphone-spytools-have-flooded-local-police-departments/512543/).
60. Id.
61. T-MOBILE U.S., TRANSPARENCY REPORT FOR 2018 6 (2018), https://www.tmobile.com/content/t-mobile/corporate/news/media-library/details/document.html/content/dam/tmobile/corporate/media-library/public/documents/TransparencyReport2018.pdf?a=b.
62. Id.
63. From January to June 2019. See AT&T INTELLECTUAL PROP., AUGUST 2019
TRANSPARENCY REPORT 4 (2019), https://about.att.com/ecms/dam/csr/2019/library/ATT_
English_TransparencyReport_Aug%202019.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
67. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 2211–12.
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This definition of CSLI creates an issue for the courts because
CSLI falls between “two lines of cases.”70 One line of cases holds a
person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their
physical movements.”71 The second line of cases abides by the “thirdparty” doctrine, which states that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”72
Various courts around the country have struggled to determine
what precedent controls the “unique nature” of CSLI.73 However, in
2018, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address this question.
In Carpenter v. United States, the Court held “that an individual
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his
physical movements as captured through [historical] CSLI,” and that
“accessing seven days of CSLI constitute[d] a Fourth Amendment
search.”74 However, the Court did not express whether this protection
applie[d] to real-time CSLI and “whether there is a limited period for
which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”75
This extremely narrow holding effectively “raise[d] more
questions than it answer[ed].”76 Most importantly, Carpenter left it to
the lower courts to interpret whether the Fourth Amendment protects
real-time CSLI and whether there is a limited time for which either
type of CSLI may be obtained without a warrant.77 Several lower
courts have addressed these questions; however, there are major splits
on when, if ever, individuals maintain a legitimate expectation of
privacy in their real-time CSLI.78

70. Id. at 2214–15.
71. Id. at 2215, 2217.
72. Id. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)); see also Sims v.
State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2749 (2019) (“To
resolve the expectation-of-privacy issue in this case, we must consider two different lines of
Supreme Court jurisprudence . . . .”).
73. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
74. Id. at 2217, 2217 n.3.
75. Id. at 2217 n.3.
76. Vanessa Blum, What’s Next for Digital Privacy? New Clashes over the Fourth
Amendment, LAW.COM: RECORDER (Mar. 7, 2019, 4:36 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/
2019/03/07/whats-next-for-digital-privacy-new-clashes-over-the-fourth-amendment.
77. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3, 2220.
78. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 943, 947, 950 n.33 (2019) (organizing lower courts’ interpretations of Carpenter into four
differing models).
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When the opportunity again arises for the Supreme Court to
address whether real-time CSLI is protected by the Fourth
Amendment, the Court should hold that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their real-time CSLI and that a warrant
should be required to access it. A brief background of the Fourth
Amendment and its evolution towards Carpenter is helpful in
understanding why this should be so.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Katz v. United States
As mentioned above, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”79 Traditionally, the
Fourth Amendment was “tied to common-law trespass,” where
unreasonable searches consisted of “physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area,” such as the home.80 However, in Katz
v. United States,81 the Supreme Court drastically expanded the
conception of the Fourth Amendment to protect an individual’s
“reasonable expectation” of privacy rather than mere “places.”82
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Katz, “laid the groundwork for the
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.”83 There, law enforcement,
without a warrant, attached an eavesdropping device to the top of a
public telephone booth to listen to and record the defendant’s
conversation.84 The prosecution later used this conversation as
evidence at trial.85 The defendant argued that the device constituted a
search and violated the Fourth Amendment because it invaded the
privacy he “justifiably relied” on when using the phone booth.86 The
government argued the device did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because it “involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth.”87
The Court sided with the defendant and famously stated that the
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”88 This meant that
the Fourth Amendment was not only violated when there was a
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351.
Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 512 (Fla. 2014).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348–49.
Id.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 351.
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“physical intrusion” of a protected area.89 Instead, the Fourth
Amendment was also violated when the defendant’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy” was invaded.90
Justice Harlan, in a concurrence, fleshed out what the Supreme
Court has subsequently adopted as the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test.91 The test consists of a two-part inquiry: (1) has the
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) “is
society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?“92
There is no definitive list as to what expectations of privacy are
“reasonable.” However, cases following Katz, such as United States v.
Knotts93 and United States v. Jones,94 where law enforcement used
tracking devices to follow the defendants’ vehicles, demonstrate how
the Supreme Court has applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test to a person’s expectation of privacy in his physical
location and movements.95
B. An Individual’s Expectation of Privacy in His or Her
Physical Location and Movements
1. United States v. Knotts
In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Knotts, held that a law
enforcement “beeper” did not violate the defendant’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”96 There, law enforcement believed the
defendant was purchasing chloroform to produce illegal drugs.97 Then,
without a warrant, law enforcement placed a beeper—a tracking
device—inside a chloroform container that was later sold to the
89. Id. at 352–53.
90. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
91. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 512 (Fla. 2014); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 406 (2012) (stating that in “later cases” the Supreme Court has “applied the analysis of Justice
Harlan’s concurrence . . . which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a
person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’”).
92. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[F]irst that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)
(reiterating the test as “first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in
the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable?”).
93. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
94. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
95. See id. at 404; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
96. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
97. Id. at 278.
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defendant.98 Relying on the beeper’s signal to keep the vehicle in view,
law enforcement followed the defendant’s vehicle carrying the
chloroform from its place of purchase to the defendant’s cabin.99 Law
enforcement then secured a search warrant for the cabin and
discovered it was being used as a drug laboratory.100
The defendant argued the use of the beeper was prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment because it violated his “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”101 The Court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test and held the beeper did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.102 It stated that a “person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another” because the movements are
“voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wants to look.”103
However, the Court made clear that this was not a blanket rule for
all future electronic-type tracking in public areas.104 It explained that
“different constitutional principles may be applicable” to “twenty-four
hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.”105
2. United States v. Jones
In 2012, the Supreme Court, in Jones, examined the “more
sophisticated surveillance . . . envisioned in Knotts and found that
different principles did indeed apply.”106 There, law enforcement
believed the defendant was trafficking narcotics and, without a
warrant, installed a tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle.107 Law
enforcement tracked the defendant for twenty-eight days and found he
was working at a narcotics stash house.108 The defendant argued the
placing of the tracking device on his vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment.109

98. Id. at 278–79.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 279.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 280–81, 285.
103. Id. at 281–82.
104. See id. at 283–84.
105. Id.
106. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018); see United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 409–13 (2012).
107. Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03.
108. Id. at 403–04.
109. See id. at 403.
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The Supreme Court agreed.110 However, instead of applying the
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the Court based its
decision on the traditional “common-law trespass” approach.111 It held
the Fourth Amendment was violated because law enforcement
physically intruded on the defendant’s “personal property to gather
information,” and therefore it was not necessary to apply the Katz
test.112
However, in the concurrences, five Justices agreed that, if the
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test was applied, “longer
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
the expectation of privacy—regardless whether those movements
were disclosed to the public at large.”113 For example, the Jones
Justices noted that the privacy concerns would be raised by conducting
GPS tracking of the defendant’s cell phone.114
Both Knotts and Jones recognized that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical movements.115
However, as technology has advanced, this expectation of privacy has
collided with the third-party doctrine.116 To understand this conflict, it
is helpful to understand the principles on which the third-party
doctrine was formed.
C. The Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine is the notion that “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.”117 However, this doctrine is not as stringent as it
sounds. The Supreme Court applied the third-party doctrine in United
States v. Miller118 and Smith v. Maryland,119 and in doing so, the Court

110. Id. at 404.
111. Id. at 404–05.
112. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
113. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2012) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430
(Alito, J., concurring)).
114. Jones, 565 U.S. at 426, 428 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
115. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215, 2217 (analyzing Knotts and Jones decisions).
116. See id. at 2214 (explaining that “personal location information maintained by a third party
does not fit neatly under existing precedents” but “lie[s] at the intersection of two lines of cases”).
117. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
118. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
119. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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did not “rely solely on the act of sharing,” but rather, it considered “the
nature of the particular documents sought.”120
1. United States v. Miller
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Miller, held the defendant had no
expectation of privacy in financial records voluntarily conveyed to a
bank.121 There, the defendant was under investigation for tax fraud,
and law enforcement used an allegedly defective subpoena to obtain
his bank records.122 The defendant argued that obtaining his records
with a defective subpoena violated his Fourth Amendment rights.123
However, the Court disagreed and held the defendant had “no
legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in” the records.124
The Court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test and laid out two reasons why the defendant had no expectation of
privacy.125 First, the Court looked to the “nature of the [records].”126
It determined the records were not “private papers,” but rather nonconfidential “negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions.”127 Second, the Court explained the records were
“voluntarily conveyed to the banks . . . in the ordinary course of
business,” and that the “Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party”128 because “(w)hat
a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”129 The Court concluded the defendant, by
“revealing his affairs to another,” had taken a risk that the information
would be conveyed “to the Government.”130
2. Smith v. Maryland
In 1979, the Supreme Court, in Smith, held the defendant had no
expectation of privacy in his records of dialed telephone numbers

120. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (considering
the nature of the information collected by the pen register).
121. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43.
122. Id. at 436.
123. Id. at 437.
124. Id. at 442.
125. Id. at 442–43.
126. Id. at 442.
127. Id. at 440–42.
128. Id. at 442–43.
129. Id. at 442 (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
130. Id. at 443.
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voluntarily conveyed to a telephone company.131 There, the defendant
was a suspect in a robbery.132 Law enforcement, without a warrant,
had a pen register133 installed on the defendant’s home phone in order
to record the numbers he dialed.134 These records led to the
defendant’s eventual arrest and conviction.135 The defendant argued
the warrantless pen register violated his “legitimate expectation of
privacy” in the “numbers he dialed on his phone.”136 However, the
Court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test and
rejected the defendant’s argument.137
Similar to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, the “nature” of
the records was essential in the Court’s decision.138 The Court doubted
that telephone users have “any [subjective] expectation of privacy
regarding the numbers they dial” because of the very “limited
capabilities” of pen registers.139 The Court emphasized that pen
registers “disclose only the telephone numbers that have been
dialed.”140 In addition, the Court concluded, the “expectation [was] not
‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’”141 because
the defendant “voluntarily conveyed” the dialed numbers and
“assumed the risk that the information would be divulged to police.”142
The third-party doctrine receives more and more criticism as
technology advances. In the 1970s, when Miller and Smith were
decided, it made sense that records with very “limited capabilities,”
such as records of dialed numbers and bank records, did not have
protection when voluntarily conveyed to a third-party.143 But now, the
“nature” of the information being conveyed is much more detailed and
intimate. Law enforcement no longer seizes records of dialed

131. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
132. Id. at 737.
133. To be clear, “pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications . . . ‘[t]hey
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed.’” Id. at 741 (quoting United States v.
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
134. Id. at 737.
135. Id. at 737–38.
136. Id. at 742.
137. See id. at 740, 745.
138. See id. at 741–42.
139. Id. at 742.
140. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
142. Id. at 745.
143. See id. at 744–45.
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numbers, but instead, seizes an individual’s exact location, within a
few feet.
The expectation of privacy in an individual’s physical location
and movements, delineated in Knotts and Jones, has collided with the
third-party doctrine of Miller and Smith. Which doctrine gives way?
The Supreme Court confronted this conflict in Carpenter and
attempted to demonstrate how these principles interact. However, the
Court’s resolution ended up “rais[ing] more questions than it
answer[ed].”144
D. Carpenter v. United States
On June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Carpenter v. United States, held that “accessing seven days of
[historical] CSLI constitute[d] a Fourth Amendment search.”145 There,
law enforcement arrested four men suspected of committing a string
of armed robberies.146 One of these men confessed and gave law
enforcement the phone numbers of other alleged accomplices,
including the cell phone number of the defendant, Timothy
Carpenter.147 Shortly after, law enforcement obtained a court order
under the Stored Communications Act to obtain seven days of
Carpenter’s historical CSLI from the service provider Sprint.148
The prosecution used the seven days of historical CSLI at trial to
show that Carpenter’s phone was “near four of the charged robberies”
at the time those robberies occurred.149 This evidence led to the
eventual conviction of Carpenter and a prison sentence of over one
hundred years.150
Carpenter appealed the conviction to the Sixth Circuit and argued
that law enforcement’s seizure of the historical CSLI “violated the
Fourth Amendment because [it] had been obtained without a warrant

144. Blum, supra note 76.
145. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.3 (2018).
146. Id. at 2212.
147. Id.
148. Id. The Stored Communications Act allows the government to obtain CSLI by simply
showing that the records are “relevant and material to an ongoing investigation,” which is a much
lower showing than the probable cause required for a warrant. Id. at 2221 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) (2012)).
149. Id. at 2213.
150. Id.
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supported by probable cause.”151 The Sixth Circuit, citing Smith,152
and applying the third-party doctrine, held that Carpenter “lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information . . .
because he had shared that information with his wireless carriers.”153
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and was faced with determining
whether “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.”154
As explained in Part III of this Note, the Carpenter Court had
difficulties resolving this issue because CSLI “does not fit neatly
under existing precedent” but instead “lie[s] at the intersection of two
lines of cases.”155 The first set being Knotts and Jones, which
addressed a “person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location
and movements,” and the second set being Miller and Smith, which
addressed the third-party doctrine.156 The Carpenter Court explained
that collection of CSLI has “many of the qualities of the GPS
monitoring . . . considered in Jones.”157 However, it also “implicates
the third-party principle of Smith and Miller” because “the individual
continuously reveals his location to his wireless carrier.”158
The collision of these two doctrines required the Court to address
a novel issue. Which doctrine gives way? Does the fact CSLI is
“shared” and “held” by a third party trump an individual’s expectation
of privacy in his or her physical location and movements? The Court
did not think so. It “decline[d] to extend” the third-party doctrine to
the collection of historical CSLI and held that “an individual maintains
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements.”159 The Court organized its analysis into two parts. First,
the Court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.
Second, the Court addressed whether the third-party doctrine extends
to CSLI.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 2212.
See supra Part III (discussing the third-party doctrine).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added) (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s holding).
Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2214.
Id. at 2215–16.
Id. at 2216.
Id.
Id. at 2217.
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1. Application of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test
In applying the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the
Court looked to Jones. It found that Jones, rather than Knotts,
controlled because Knotts dealt with a less sophisticated form of
surveillance distinguishable from CSLI.160 It began by acknowledging
that a majority of the Supreme Court, in both Jones and Knotts, have
“already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the whole of their physical movements.”161 However, the
Carpenter Court took this expectation much further.
The Court explained that CSLI “hold[s] for many Americans the
‘privacies of life.’”162 It stated that CSLI is an “all-encompassing
record” which “provides an intimate window into a person’s life,
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his
‘familial,
political,
professional,
religious,
and
sexual
163
associations.’” It reasoned that collection of CSLI “present[s] even
greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring . . . in Jones.”164
This was because cell phones are a “feature of human anatomy,” and
unlike the GPS monitoring of a vehicle in Jones, individuals
“regularly” and “compulsively” bring their cell phones with them
everywhere.165 This allows law enforcement to monitor far beyond
“public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices,
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”166
The Court concluded that, with CSLI, law enforcement had
“access to a category of information otherwise unknowable”; it “can
now travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts,” and the
only restraint is the length of time the data is retained by wireless
carriers.167 Accordingly, the Court held that it was reasonable for
society to expect that law enforcement will not “catalogue every single

160. See id. at 2218. (explaining that “[u]nlike the bugged container in Knotts . . . a cell phone
. . . tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner”).
161. Id. at 2217.
162. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
163. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
164. Id. at 2218.
165. Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385).
166. Id.
167. Id. (“[W]ireless carriers . . . currently maintain records for up to five years.”).
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movement” of an individual,168 and that allowing law enforcement to
access CSLI “contravenes that expectation.”169
2. Application of the Third-Party Doctrine
Next, the Court moved to the second part of its analysis:
application of the third-party doctrine. In doing so, the Court
addressed the two rationales behind the third-party doctrine: “the
nature of the particular documents”170 and “voluntary exposure.”171
The Court began by addressing the “nature of the particular
documents.”172 The government argued that the third-party doctrine
should be applied to CSLI because, like the dialed numbers and bank
records in Smith and Miller, CSLI are “‘business records’ created and
maintained by the wireless carriers.”173 However, the Court disagreed
because the government failed to acknowledge the “seismic shifts”174
in surveillance technology that allowed law enforcement to track “not
only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a short
period but for years and years.”175
Furthermore, the Court distinguished CSLI from the “limited
types of personal information” sought in Smith and Miller.176 It found
there was a “world of difference” between dialed numbers and bank
records, and the “exhaustive chronicle of location information
casually collected by wireless carriers.”177 While dialed numbers and
bank records “reveal little in the way of ‘identifying information,’”178
CSLI has “no comparable limitations on [its] revealing nature.”179
CSLI discloses a “detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence
compiled every day, every moment, over several years.”180 Thus, the
Court concluded that due to the “nature” of CSLI, the government
168. Id. at 2217; see Sabrina McCubbin, Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in Carpenter v.
United States, LAWFARE: BLOG (June 22, 2018, 2:05 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
summary-supreme-court-rules-carpenter-v-united-states.
169. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
170. Id. at 2219 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
171. Id. at 2220.
172. Id. at 2219.
173. Id.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2220.
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“[was] not asking for a straightforward application of the third-party
doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category
of information.”181
Next, the Court moved to the second rationale underlying the
third-party doctrine: “voluntary exposure.”182 The Court explained
that CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the
term.”183 CSLI is generated by “[v]irtually any activity on the phone,”
including “incoming calls, texts, or e-mails,” and therefore can be
generated “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up.”184 Furthermore, cell phones are “‘such a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to
participation in modern society.”185 Thus, the Court concluded that
“there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data,”186
and “in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the
risk’” of sharing the data.187 Consequently, the Court declined to
extend the third-party doctrine to the collection of historical CSLI.188
3. The Supreme Court’s Holding
Accordingly, the Court held that “an individual maintains a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements as captured through CSLI.”189 However, in controversial
fashion, the Court made clear its decision was “a narrow one.”190 The
Court stated that its holding did not apply to “real-time CSLI” and did
not decide whether there was a limited period for which law
enforcement may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI without a
warrant.191 It stated that it was “sufficient for our purposes . . . to hold
that accessing seven days of CSLI constitute[d] a Fourth Amendment
search.”192

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 2219.
Id. at 2220.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)).
See id.
Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2220.
See id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2217 n.3 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, the Supreme Court left it to the lower courts to
interpret whether individuals maintain a legitimate expectation of
privacy in their real-time CSLI and whether accessing less than seven
days of CSLI constitutes a search.193
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
Several lower courts have addressed whether the protections of
Carpenter extend to real-time CSLI and whether accessing less than
seven days of CSLI constitutes a search. However, the lower courts
are split on when, if ever, individuals maintain a legitimate expectation
of privacy in their real-time CSLI.194 There are three lower court
decisions that demonstrate the wide-ranging interpretations of
Carpenter: Andres v. State,195 Sims v. State,196 and Commonwealth v.
Almonor.197
In Andres, the Supreme Court of Florida held the Carpenter
ruling did not apply to real-time CSLI.198 In Sims, the Texas Criminal
Appeals Court held an individual did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in three hours of real-time CSLI.199 And, in
Almonor, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that collection of
any CSLI intruded on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.200
A. Andres v. State
In September 2018, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Andres
and found the Carpenter holding inapplicable because Florida law
enforcement had used real-time CSLI to locate the defendant.201
193. See Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 n.8 (Mass. 2019) (explaining that
the Supreme Court “expressly avoided” addressing the protection of real-time CSLI).
194. See Rozenshtein, supra note 78, at 950–51.
195. 254 So. 3d 283 (Fla. 2018).
196. 569 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2749 (2019).
197. 120 N.E.3d 1183 (Mass. 2019).
198. Andres, 254 So. 3d at 297 n.7.
199. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 646.
200. See Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1195–96; see also Jennifer Lynch, Massachusetts Court
Blocks Warrantless Access to Real-Time Cell Phone Location Data, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/massachusetts-court-blockswarrantless-access-real-time-cell-phone-location-data (explaining that the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts held that “police access to real-time cell phone location data—whether it comes
from a phone company or from technology like a cell site simulator—intrudes on a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy”).
201. Andres, 254 So. 3d at 297 n.7; see also Peter A. Crusco, ‘Carpenter’ Squared: Review and
Reconcile State Court Cases Impacted by Landmark SCOTUS Decision, LAW.COM: N.Y.L.J.
(Apr. 22, 2019, 2:50 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/04/22/carpenter-
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There, the defendant was a suspect in a murder case, and law
enforcement obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s body, home,
and van.202 Law enforcement then used a cell-site simulator, or
Stingray, to locate the defendant and execute the warrant.203 Upon
finding and arresting the defendant, law enforcement took a DNA
sample as well as photographs of his body, which led to the
defendant’s eventual conviction.204
The defendant attempted to suppress this evidence by arguing that
an additional “probable cause warrant was required” to use the cellsite simulator.205 The court rejected the argument. It held that the
evidence obtained—the DNA and photographs—was “well within the
scope of the [original] warrant” and an additional warrant was not
needed.206 In coming to this decision, the court explicitly stated that
the Carpenter “holding [was] not applicable . . . [because] officers
used real-time cell-site location information.”207
B. Sims v. State
In January 2019, the Texas Criminal Appeals Court decided Sims
and held that three hours of real-time CSLI tracking did not intrude on
the legitimate expectation of privacy afforded by the Fourth
Amendment.208 The defendant, a murder suspect, was identified
driving the victim’s vehicle and using the victim’s credit cards.209 The
officer who made this discovery went back to his office to obtain a
warrant to ping the defendant’s cell phone.210 However, upon arrival,
he discovered that another officer had already done so without a proper
warrant.211 The warrantless pinging allowed law enforcement to track

squared-review-and-reconcile-state-court-cases-impacted-by-landmark-scotus-decision
(“The
court concluded that Carpenter was inapplicable because the officers used the simulator to obtain
real-time cell site location information to locate Andres and execute the warrant.”).
202. Andres, 254 So. 3d at 291, 297.
203. Id. at 297.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 298.
207. Id. at 297 n.7.
208. Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2749
(2019); see also Benson Varghese, Sims v. State: Can Police Obtain Real-Time Cell Site Location
Without
Warrant?, VARGHESE SUMMERSETT: BLOG (Mar. 2, 2019),
https://www.versustexas.com/criminal/sims-v-state (explaining the Sims decision).
209. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 638.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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the defendant in real-time, and led to the defendant’s arrest and the
discovery of key evidence.212 The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence and argued that accessing his real-time CSLI without a
warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights.213
The court looked to Carpenter to determine whether obtaining
real-time CSLI records without a warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment.214 It began by stating that there was no difference
between real-time and historical CSLI records when it came to Fourth
Amendment protection and applying Carpenter.215 In fact, the court
hinted that real-time CSLI may be even more intrusive due to the fact
that real-time records “are generated solely at the behest of law
enforcement.”216
However, the court then applied a unique test, which was
inconsistent with Carpenter. It explained that when defining Fourth
Amendment protection, it is not the “content,” or the “nature,” of the
CSLI records that matters.217 Instead, it is whether the government
seized “enough” information to violate a legitimate expectation of
privacy.218 The court looked to “how long” law enforcement tracked a
person.219 It explained there is “no bright-line rule for determining
how long police must track a person’s cell phone in real time before it
violates a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy in those records,”
but rather, it “must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”220
The Sims court explained that the Carpenter Court was “not
totally clear” when it held that Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when “at least seven days” of CSLI was accessed.221 It argued that the
Court “might have meant that accessing less than seven days of
historical CSLI could also violate” the Fourth Amendment, or “it

212. Id. at 639.
213. Id. at 637.
214. See id. at 645.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 645 n.15.
217. Id. at 645–46; see also Varghese, supra note 208 (“In determining whether obtaining realtime CSLI records violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court looked to Carpenter and determined
that what mattered was not the content of the CSLI records, but rather was whether the government
seized ‘enough’ information from the records that it violated a legitimate expectation to privacy.”).
218. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645–46.
219. Id. at 646.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 646 n.17.
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might have meant that a person has [an] expectation of privacy in
seven days or more of CSLI, but no less.”222
Then, very abruptly, and with very little explanation, the Sims
court concluded that the defendant “did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his physical movements or his location as
reflected in the less than three hours of real-time CSLI records
accessed by police by pinging his phone less than five times.”223 The
court referred to Carpenter to explain that “longer-term surveillance
might infringe on a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy if the
location records reveal the ‘privacies of [his] life,’ but this [was] not
that case.”224
C. Commonwealth v. Almonor
In April 2019, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided
Almonor, and extended warrant protections to all real-time CSLI, no
matter the type or how long the individual was tracked.225 There, the
defendant was a murder suspect and law enforcement warrantlessly
pinged his cell phone in an effort to locate him.226 The pinging allowed
law enforcement to find the defendant and the murder weapon.227
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that law
enforcement pinging his “cell phone to reveal its real-time location
constitute[d] a search” under the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (“Article 14”).228 The court
agreed and held the pinging constituted a search under Article 14.229
Although the defendant brought both federal and state
constitutional claims, the court based its decision solely on Article
14.230 However, for the purposes of this Note, the arguments and
222. Id.
223. Id. at 646.
224. Id. (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018)). Going even further,
the court noted that prior to Carpenter it held, in Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015), that a “warrantless search of four days of historical CSLI did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 645 n.16. The court stated this holding was “prescient” and still valid because
Carpenter only held “police needed a warrant to access seven days of historical CSLI, which was
three days more than in Ford.” Id.
225. See Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1195–96 (Mass. 2019).
226. Id. at 1187.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1188.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 1191 n.9 (“[A]s we conclude that a ping is a search under art. 14, ‘we have no
need to wade into these Fourth Amendment waters.’ Instead we ‘decide the issue based on our State
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points made by the court in support of the protection of real-time CSLI
under Article 14 should, and could, be directly applied to Fourth
Amendment protection.231 In fact, the lower court judge concluded
that the ping was a search under the Fourth Amendment,232 and most
of the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s analysis entails looking to
cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment.233
The State raised two arguments in defense of its warrantless ping
of the defendant’s phone. First, it argued that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone’s real-time
CSLI.234 Second, citing Commonwealth v. Estabrook235—a preCarpenter case—it argued CSLI could be obtained without a warrant
as long as it was less than six hours.236 However, the court rejected
both arguments.237
In applying the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the
court focused on “the nature of intrusion.”238 In particular, the court
emphasized that pinging was “initiated and effectively controlled by
the police, and [was] done without any express or implied
authorization or other involvement by the individual cell phone
user.”239 The court explained that law enforcement’s ability to obtain
real-time CSLI was an “extraordinarily powerful surveillance tool
[that] finds no analog in the traditional surveillance methods,” such as
patrolling streets, interviewing individuals, and knocking on doors to
locate persons of interest.240 For this reason, the court held that
Constitution . . . .’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846
(Mass. 2014), and then quoting Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 80 N.E.3d 318 (Mass. 2017)).
231. See Lynch, supra note 200 (Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights “was
drafted before—and served as one of the models for—our federal Bill of Rights. Article 14, one of
the cornerstones of the Massachusetts Constitution, is the state’s equivalent to the Fourth
Amendment.”).
232. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1190 (explaining that after a three-day evidentiary hearing, “the
motion judge concluded that the ping of the defendant’s cell phone was a search under the Fourth
Amendment”).
233. Id. at 1191 n.9 (explaining that the court looked to cases interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, such as Katz, Jones, and Carpenter, for “historical context and more general
guidance”).
234. See id. at 1196–97.
235. 38 N.E.3d 231 (Mass. 2015).
236. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1196–97 (citing Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d at 237 (holding that law
enforcement “may obtain historical CSLI for a period of six hours or less relating to an identified
person’s cellular telephone from the cellular service provider without obtaining a search warrant”)).
237. See id. at 1193, 1997.
238. Id. at 1192.
239. Id. at 1193.
240. Id. at 1194–95.
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“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement could not
secretly and instantly identify a person’s real-time physical location at
will,” and that “[a]llowing law enforcement to immediately locate an
individual whose whereabouts were previously unknown by
compelling that individual’s cell phone to reveal its location
contravene[d] that expectation.”241
In addition, the court noted that “[m]anipulating our phones for
the purpose of identifying and tracking our personal location
present[ed] an even greater intrusion”242 than “accessing the historical
location data at issue in Carpenter.”243 This is because “cell phones
are ‘an indispensable part of’ daily life,”244 and therefore the “ability
to identify a cell phone’s real-time location is . . . the ability to identify
the real-time location of its user.”245
Additionally, the court held the “six-hour rule” from Estabrook
only applied to historical “telephone call” CSLI, rather than real-time
CSLI.246 The court explained that there were “fundamental
differences” between historical “telephone call” CSLI, which is
collected and stored by service providers when a cell phone user
voluntarily makes or receives a telephone call, and “police action that
causes a cell phone to identify its real-time location.”247 However, this
analysis is flawed because historical CSLI is not only created when a
user makes or receives a phone call. Instead, historical CSLI may be
created even if the owner is not using the phone at all.248
The court should have held that the six-hour rule does not apply
to any collection of CSLI. However, besides the six-hour rule holding,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court got it right. Unlike the Supreme
Court in Carpenter, the Massachusetts Supreme Court left no
questions unanswered. It “confidently” held that collection of any
CSLI—whether it comes from a service provider’s historical phone

241. Id. at 1195.
242. Id. at 1194.
243. Lynch, supra note 200.
244. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1194 (quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 859
(Mass. 2014)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1197.
247. Id.
248. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 4, at 16
(explaining that smartphones “generate location data even in the absence of any user interaction
with the phone”).
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records or from technology like a cell-site simulator—intruded on a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.249
V. WHY REAL-TIME CSLI SHOULD BE PROTECTED
AND WHAT TO EXPECT GOING FORWARD
Andres and Sims are great examples of how an individual’s rights
may be violated after the Supreme Court avoids addressing an
important question. Hopefully, in the near future, the right case will
reach the Supreme Court so that it can resolve this issue. However, in
the meantime, lower courts should follow the lead of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Almonor and hold that individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their real-time CSLI.250
Further, the courts should hold that a warrant is required to access
CSLI for any period of time. In addition, state legislators should take
matters into their own hands and pass legislation prohibiting the
collection of all CSLI without a warrant.
Carpenter and Almonor got several things right. However, each
had its flaws. Going forward, courts must recognize these flaws when
addressing the protections of CSLI. Courts must acknowledge two
main points: (1) although the Carpenter decision involved historical
CSLI, the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court—that
collection of historical CSLI from third-party phone companies is a
Fourth Amendment search that requires a warrant—should apply
equally to the collection of real-time CSLI; and (2) although the
Carpenter decision loosely held that a warrant is required only for
collection of more than seven days of CSLI, a person’s privacy interest
in CSLI should not be limited by time.
A. The Protections of Carpenter Should Apply to Real-Time CSLI
When it comes to determining (1) whether a person has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in real-time CSLI, and (2) whether
the third-party doctrine should apply, there is “no difference” between
historical and real-time CSLI.251

249. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1197.
250. See id.
251. See Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 645 n.15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 2749 (2019) (explaining that for purposes of applying the third-party doctrine and for
determining whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his physical movements
and location, there is “no difference” between real-time and historical CSLI).
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1. An Individual Has a Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in His or Her Real-Time CSLI
The application of the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test to real-time and historical CSLI is very similar. Recall that the test
has two prongs: first, the individual must have a subjective expectation
of privacy; and second, the expectation must be reasonable.252 In most
cases, the subjective expectation is easily met because courts
recognize that “no one buys a cell phone to share detailed information”
with law enforcement.253 Thus, the bulk of the analysis is dedicated to
determining whether the expectation was reasonable.
The Supreme Court in Carpenter confirmed that it is society’s
expectation that law enforcement will not “catalogue every single
movement” of an individual.254 The Court held that allowing law
enforcement to access historical CSLI without a warrant
“contravene[d] that expectation.”255 How is the warrantless collection
of real-time CSLI any different? The answer is, it is not. “Allowing
law enforcement to immediately locate an individual whose
whereabouts were previously unknown,” and track his or her every
movement “by compelling that individual’s cell phone to reveal its
location” also “contravenes that expectation.”256
In Carpenter, the Court emphasized that the warrantless
collection of historical CSLI “contravenes that expectation”257
because historical CSLI can reach beyond areas of traditional
surveillance.258 In particular, it stated that a “cell phone faithfully
follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private
residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other
potentially revealing locales.”259 This reasoning also applies to the

252. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (requiring
“first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
253. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 643 (N.J. 2013).
254. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012)); see also McCubbin, supra note 168 (explaining the Carpenter decision).
255. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
256. Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1195 (Mass. 2019).
257. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
258. See id. at 2218 (“Unlike the bugged container in Knotts, or the car in Jones, a cell phone—
almost a ‘feature of human anatomy’—tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner.” (citation
omitted) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014))).
259. Id.
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collection of real-time CSLI, “because it, too, allows the government
to follow people into homes and other private spaces.”260
2. The Third-Party Doctrine Should Not Extend
to the Collection of Real-Time CSLI
The Supreme Court—in Miller, Smith, and Carpenter—has made
clear that the application of the third-party doctrine turns on two
rationales: “the nature of the particular documents” and “voluntary
exposure.”261
a. Nature of real-time CSLI collection is more intrusive
than historical CSLI collection
The nature of real-time CSLI collection is “not meaningfully
different” than historical CSLI collection when it comes to applying
the third-party doctrine.262 In fact, in most cases, the nature of realtime CSLI collection is even more intrusive. Both historical and realtime CSLI are records of location information which hold the
“privacies of life.”263 They are both “all-encompassing” records which
may reveal a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”264 However, there is one significant difference
that makes real-time CSLI even more invasive. Unlike historical
CSLI, which are “business records” that are “maintained by cell phone
service providers for business purposes, [and] are occasionally
accessed by law enforcement, real-time CSLI records are generated
solely at the behest of law enforcement.”265 In other words, service
260. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & American Civil Liberties Union
of Massachusetts, Inc. et al., Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183 (Mass. 2019) (No. SJC12499), 2018 WL 4154833, at *18.
261. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976)) (explaining that when applying the third-party doctrine courts do “not rely solely on the act
of sharing,” but rather, “they [also] consider[] ‘the nature of the particular documents sought’” and
limitations on any “legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents”); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741, 743–44 (1979) (explaining that in applying the third-party doctrine
“it is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged,”
as well as stating “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (examining the “nature of the particular
documents sought” and whether the information was “voluntarily conveyed” when applying the
third-party doctrine).
262. Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 645 n.15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
2749 (2019).
263. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
264. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
265. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645 n.15; see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
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providers do not collect or retain real-time CSLI. The only time it is
collected is when law enforcement requests it.266
b. An individual does not voluntarily share real-time CSLI
The Supreme Court has held that historical CSLI is not “truly
‘shared’” with the third-party cell service providers.267 This decision
was made even though historical CSLI may sometimes be generated
by the affirmative action of the cell phone user, such as when the user
makes a phone call or sends a text message.268 However, unlike
historical CSLI, real-time CSLI is never generated by the affirmative
action of the cell phone user.269
As explained in Part II, there are two methods law enforcement
use to collect real-time CSLI: pinging and cell-site simulators.270 In
both of these methods, law enforcement affirmatively compels a cell
phone to transmit its real-time CSLI when it would not do so on its
own.271 In addition, when cell-site simulators are used, law
enforcement does not need the assistance of a service provider
whatsoever.272 The simulators allow law enforcement to “circumvent
the service provider and gain direct access to real-time” CSLI,
therefore taking the third-party completely out of the equation.273
Accordingly, if the third-party doctrine does not extend to the
collection of historical CSLI, it should not extend to the collection of
real-time CSLI. While historical CSLI is sometimes shared with thirdparty service providers through the affirmative actions of users, realtime CSLI is never shared with a third-party service provider, and
sometimes a third-party service provider is not even involved.

266. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Mass. 2019) (explaining
that “[w]ithout police direction, [real-time CSLI] would also not otherwise be collected and retained
by the service provider”).
267. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
268. See id. at 2212 (“While carriers have long retained CSLI for the start and end of incoming
calls, in recent years phone companies have also collected location information from the
transmission of text messages and routine data connections.”).
269. See Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645 n.15.
270. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2; see supra Part II.
271. See Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 636 n.1 (explaining that when collecting real-time CSLI, law
enforcement officers “proactively” identify a phone’s real-time location “when the cell phone
would not ordinarily transmit its location on its own”).
272. See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2.
273. Id.
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B. An Individual’s Privacy Interest in CSLI
Should Not Be Limited by Time
The Texas Criminal Appeals Court in Sims was wrong when it
held that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test turns on
“how long” law enforcement tracks a person.274 The collection of realtime CSLI “for even one data point is a search” and should require a
warrant.275 Like the courts in Carpenter and Almonor stated, the Katz
test requires courts to analyze the nature of the particular documents,
not just the amount of information that they reveal.276 Thus, even if
the amount of CSLI collected only covered a short period of time, it
would not change the analysis. This is because, “it is not . . . the length
of the monitoring that offends the constitution but rather the place of
the monitoring . . . that does.”277
When law enforcement tracks an individual in real-time, it is
doing so blindly. Law enforcement obtains an individual’s real-time
CSLI “without knowing in advance where or [sometimes] even who
they are.”278 This means that law enforcement may ping a cell phone
when the individual is in a constitutionally protected place, such as the
home. This is true regardless of whether law enforcement tracks a
person for three hours, seven days, or several months.
If law enforcement agencies “warrantlessly enter a private home
to determine a defendant’s location, they cannot successfully justify
that invasion of privacy by arguing that they stayed inside for just a
short time.”279 With collection of real-time CSLI, the “result should
be no different.”280
C. States Should Pass Legislation Prohibiting the Collection of CSLI
Instead of waiting for the issue to make its way to the Supreme
Court, states should take matters into their own hands and pass
274. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645–46 (explaining that “[w]hether a particular government action
constitutes a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ does not turn on the content of the CSLI records; it turns on
whether the government searched or seized ‘enough’ information”).
275. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & American Civil Liberties Union
of Massachusetts, Inc. et al., supra note 260, at 16.
276. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018); Commonwealth v. Almonor,
120 N.E.3d 1183, 1192 n.11 (Mass. 2019).
277. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & American Civil Liberties Union
of Massachusetts, Inc. et al., supra note 260, at 15.
278. Id. at 19.
279. Id. at 14.
280. Id.
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legislation prohibiting the collection of all CSLI without a warrant.
Presently, nine states require a warrant to access all CSLI, four states
prohibit real-time tracking without a warrant, and two states require a
warrant for the use of cell-site simulators.281 However, this is not
enough. All states that do not currently require a warrant to access all
CSLI should look to Utah’s Electronic Information or Data Privacy
Act282 (“HB 57”) as a model.
Utah’s HB 57, which was passed on March 27, 2019,283 is the
most protective law concerning third-party-held data and represents a
huge step in the right direction.284 It not only imposes a warrant
requirement for all location information transmitted by an electronic
device, it also “ensures that search engines, email providers, social
media, cloud storage, and any other third-party ‘electronic
communications service’ or ‘remote computing service’ are fully
protected under the Fourth Amendment (and its equivalent in the Utah
Constitution).”285 Thus, this law protects even “private electronic data
stored with third parties such as Facebook, Dropbox, Twitter, or
Google without a warrant.”286 In addition, “once agencies execute a
warrant, they must then notify owners within 14 days that their data
has been searched”287 and must “‘destroy in an unrecoverable manner’
the data it obtains ‘as soon as reasonably possible after the electronic
information or data is collected.’”288

281. See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 4.
282. See H.B. 57, 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019).
283. See Cara MacDonald, Gov. Herbert Signs Bill Requiring Police Obtain Search Warrants
to Access Electronic Information, KSL.COM (Mar. 28, 2019, 6:28 PM),
https://www.ksl.com/article/46520524/gov-herbert-signs-bill-requiring-police-obtain-searchwarrants-to-access-electronic-information.
284. See Nick Sibilla, Utah Bans Police from Searching Digital Data Without a Warrant,
Closes Fourth Amendment Loophole, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2019, 11:35 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2019/04/16/utah-bans-police-from-searching-digitaldata-without-a-warrant-closes-fourth-amendment-loophole (explaining that “Utah became the first
state in the nation to ban warrantless searches of electronic data”).
285. Id.
286. Anna Parsons, Utah Has Stepped Up to Protect Fourth Amendment Rights Online. Will
Your State Do the Same?, WASH. EXAMINER (June 19, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/utah-has-stepped-up-to-protect-fourthamendment-rights-online-will-your-state-do-the-same.
287. Sibilla, supra note 284.
288. Allison Grande, Utah Warrant Bill Raises Stakes for Cops’ Digital Data Grabs, LAW360
(Apr. 23, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://etron.lls.edu:2195/articles/1151791/utah-warrant-bill-raisesstakes-for-cops-digital-data-grabs.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment was implemented to protect people from
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the warrantless
collection of CSLI disregards that notion. Advances in technology
move much faster than the law, so courts must make a concerted effort
to keep up. Fortunately, it seems they are doing so. When it comes to
the protection of an individual’s CSLI, “a consensus appears to be
emerging in favor of a warrant requirement.”289 This trend is
evidenced by judicial decisions such as Carpenter and Almonor and
legislation such as HB 57. These actions indicate a “broader trend”
and effort by judiciaries and legislators to “define the parameters” of
digital protection.290 In effect, these rulings and legislation are
chipping away at the third-party doctrine of the 1970s and making it
clear that the law must evolve with advancing technology.291 It looks
promising that, in the near future, all Americans will be properly
protected against warrantless searches of their CSLI.

289. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2.
290. See Grande, supra note 288 (“This is part of a broader trend that we’re seeing in the
legislative and judicial arenas to really sort of define the parameters of cyber investigations in terms
of what’s available to law enforcement and under what standard.” (quoting Edward McAndrew, a
DLA partner and former federal cybercrime prosecutor)).
291. See id. (“As the Supreme Court has said, digital is different, and I think this is a recognition
of that, at least by one state.” (quoting Edward McAndrew)).

